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Doubtlessly no provision of our constitution will
ever be more sacredly guarded than that portion of the
Sixth Amendment whereby it has been declared that "No
person shall be deprived of life,liberty or property,
without due process of law." Inheirited as it is from
"Magna Charta" and the "Bill of Rihts" ,it has been for
so many decades recognized by the citizens of this
cointry as,perhaps,the main bulwark of their liberty
that we might perhaps expect to find that our legis-
lators would never presume to violate its provisions.
Yet notwithstanding this we constantly find that the
constitutionality of legislative acts is brought into
question in courts of justice by reason of this very
amendment.
It is true that, so far as I am aware, there has
been no instance of any )pen and direct attempt by
our legislators to deprive individuals of life or lib-
erty without due process of law,yet in a civilized com-
mercial nation like our own, wherein the rights of
property assume such wonderfully varied shapes, in
many instances requiring legislative regulations in
order that individual ambition, se valuable if pror.-
erly directed,may not derenerate into a public injury,
it may sometirnes,nay in fact often does haT-ren, that
an injustice is done to individual prop~erty interests,
and we frequently find tTat citizens who are dissatis-
fied with legislative enactments, seek aid from that
department of orr government which forms such an ad-
mirable check on hasty legislation and endeavor to
prevent the execution of legislative acts through the in-
strumentality of this amendment. The regulation of
the liquor traffic has 'een, doubtlessly, one of the
most difficult questions with which the legislatures of
our various states have been compelled to deal and
in questioning the constitutionality of the "Civil Dam-
age Act',which is undoubtedly but one form of regulaticn
vartous classes of our citizens have afforded a specif-
ic and good illustration of the legal methods sometimes
employed to escape, through the instrumentality of this
famous "Sixth Amendment'.the consequences of legislative
acts displeasing to the-, selves.
The "Civil Daraage Act" passed in the legislature
of the State of New York, the 29th of May LS73,declares
that " Svery husband,wife,child,paremt,guardian,emplovee
or other person who shall be injured in person, or prop-
erty,or means of support,by an intoxicated person, or
in consequence of the intoxication,habitual or other-
wise,of any person, shnll have a right ot action in his
or her name,against any person or persons,who shall have,
by selling or givin7 away intoxicating liquors, caused
the intoxication,in whole or in part, of such person
or persons,and any person or persons, owning or renting,
or permitting the occupation of any building or premises,
and having knowledge that intoxicating liquors are to
be sold therein, shall be liableseverally or jointly,
with the person or persons,selling or -iving, away the
intoxicating liquors aforesaid,for all damages sustained,
and for exemplary damages; and all darnages recovered
by a minor under this act shall be paid either to such
minor or to his or her parentsguardian, or next friend,
as the court shall direct; and the unlawful sale or
giving away of intoxicating liquors,shall work forfeit-
ure of all rifrhts of the lessee or tenant ,under any
lease or contract of rent upon the premises."
The constitutionality of this act,in so far as the
right to bring an action against the owner of the real
property in which the liquor was sold, is concerned, was
early brought in question on the ground tbat it is a
violation of the Sixth Avendrnent of the Constitution of
the United States,heretofore cited, and a violation,as
well,of the corresponding provision in the Constitution
of the State of New York. The owners of the premises
who were sued for damages under the statute claim that
the effect of the statute was to deprive them of' their
property without due process of law and to transfer it
to others through the agency of third persons and with-
out their consent. While concedinr that the legisla-
ture, when acting in the capacity of a protector of in-
fants,lunatics,and pers'ons incapacitated to act for
themselves, might pass laws for the disposition of the
property of such incapacitated persons when their in-
terests so demanded and yet violate no provision of the
constitution,they denied that the legislature could pass
such laws in cases wherein it appeared that the owners
were not thus incapacitated.
A notable exception to this rule appears in the
instance of the right of "Eminent Domain" wherein,
upon the ground that "private interests must yield to
public necessity", private property is allowel to be
taken for public uses by act of the legislature,but
under the imposition of a healthy restraint that such
private property cannot be taken without the payment of
a just and adequate compensation therefor. The oppo-
nents of the Civil Damage Act state, however,that this
is very different from a legislative grant of the right
to take or sell private property under the pretext of
some public use and then to give the proceeds to some
third person,which is, as they claim, the virtual effect
of the eivil Damage Act.
The constitutional controversy to which I have but
alluded,is a most interesting one and the claims of the
opponents of the act are certainly not to be cast aside
as unworthy of consideration. Chief Justice Story,in the
case of Taylor v. . Porter (4 Hill 140)) nises this lan-
guage:" The security of life,liberty,and property lies
at the foundation of the social compact; and to say that
the Prant of legislative powers to a senate and assem-
bly includes the right to attack privat property,is
equivalent to saying" that the people have delef'ated to
their servants the power of defeatin- one of the great
ends fcr which government was established." Our legis-
lators then, if they do not wish their acts declared un-
constitutional, must have a care that they do not vio-
late the spirit of the Sixth Amendment.
Nor is it a sufficient answer to a claim that an
act is unconstitutional to allege that the act itself
does not directly deprive any individual of his property
but that such property is only taken after "due legal
process" and condemnation in courts of justice. The
leaxned Chief Justice Story further states that the
"law of the land" as used in Article VII Sec.1 of the
New York Constitution wherein appears the phrase "No
member of this state shall be disfranchised,or deprived
of any of the rights or privleges secured to any citi-
zen thereof,unless by the law of the land or by the
judgment of his peers," does not inellude mere legisla-
tive enactments but. refers to judicial investigation
conducted according to law. Yet to hold that a judg-
ment is valid because all the proper forms of procedure
in the courts of justice have been observed when the
statute authorizitg such procedure is valid would be
absurd.
The opponents of the act alluded with great confi-
dence to the celebrated case of Wynehamer v. The Peo-
ple (13 N.Y. 387),in which the prohibition of tbe sale
of intoxicating liquors was declaredto be unconstitu-
tionalno discrimination having been made between li-
quors already purchased by dealers and the liquors rhich
might be subsequently manufactured or imported. The
court in that case sums up the whole argument in the
statement that "theories of public good must give way
to the rights of rrivate property;" virtually holding
that although the liquor traffic be conceded to be harm-
ful yet inasmuch as the prohibition of the sale of
property lessens its value and any such diminUtion
of value is in effect a takingz of property such act
would come within the prohibition of the cnstitution.
The general prihciples by the aid of which the
constitutionality of the Civil Dama7e Act has been
brought in qiiestion are themselves unquestioned ,and
it merely remains for us to consider whether or no they
have in this instance been misaiplied. That they are
not to be narrowly construed courts have acknotledged
and that an absolute taking of property is not necessary,
as we have seen, to constitute a violation of the Sixth
Amendment,for any act destroying in any measure its
value,constitutes in itself such violation. As Judge
Miller has said in Pumpelly v. Green Pay Company (13
Wallace 166), " There may be such serious interruption
to the comon and necessary use of property as will be
equivalent to a taking within the meaning of the con-
stitution'.' fowever in all the arguments which we have
touched upon thus far we have overlooked the "police
power" of the state,by which is given to Congress ,under
the plea of protecting the public safety,health and wel-
fare,the power to declare certain lines of conduct
criminal. The "Slaughter House Cases" (16 Wallace
36),wheoein we are told that iinder the title of "An Act
to protect the public health' Louisiana gave to a cer-
tain corporation the exclusive right to slaughter cat-
tle tithin a certain territory, although other slaught-
er houses were in existence at the time in the pre-
scribed territory, is suggestive of .he fact that the
liberality of construction in favor of the "Police"regu-
lations, is no less marked than that which we have found
in favor of the sixth Amendment. In the language of
Jud-:e Field in the case above cited: " All sorts of
restrictions and burdens are imposed under the police
power, and when thesd are not in conflict with any
constitutional prohibitions or fundamental princi-
ples, they cannot be successfull, assailed in a judi-
cial tribunal, .... 6 ....... but under the pretence of
prescribing a police regulation,the state carnot be per-
mitted to encroach upon any of the rights of the citizen
which the constitution intended to secure ar-ainst
abridgment." All that the court can do,then, is to
scrutinize the acts of the legislature and be assured
that our legislators have not under the guise of a mere
health regulation, as in the Cigar Tenement House Case,
decided in the Court of Appeals in iq85, in reality
passed an act which had no relqtion thereto.
Th- constitutional controversyhas ,-erefore not
been an unnatural one but it has been cut short and
thewhnlematter set at rest by the decisicn of the
Court of Appeals in t-he case of Bertholf v. O'Reilly
(74 TI.Y. 509) wherein our highest court has distinctly
recognized the constitutionality of the act. Referring
to the case of Wynehamer v. The People,which we have
already cited, they state that the power of the leg-
islature to absolutely prohibit the sale of liquor,with
due regard to the vested rights of property, has been
distinctly recognized, and t1ry deny that a law requir-
ing an owner of property' to refrain from renting his
property to be rsed for the sale of liquor so diminishes
the value of such property as to constitute a taking
within the prohibition of the Sixth Amendment; but on
the contrary it can be considered no deprivation to the
owner of property that he being required to refrain
from the renting of his property for such purposes,
or if he do so lease his property he must be considered
2s leasin the same subject Lo any liability which the
"Civil Damage Act" -LiLQses
The sale of intoxicatirn liquors, as is eviderced
by the title ar plied to the "Civil Damage Act" by the
legislature,is recognized as a fruitful source of' pauper-
ism and crime and consequently the legislature by rea-
son of its delegated police powers posesses the right to
limit the business in any way which it may see fit and
it is no hardship that one who conducts the same or
in any way assists should be bcund by any such restrict-
ions as a legislature may see fit to impose out of a
due regard for the public welfare.
The other main objection which,under the authority
of Ryan v. N.Y.Central R.T.Co.(35N.Y.209),has been
raised egainst the constitutionality of the act in so
far as it imposes a liability uron the owner of the
premises for the acts of the individual to whom his
lessee has sold liquor is to be found in the fact that
the damages are net the necessary and proximate con-
sequences of the act of such owner but are the remote
and indirect consequences of this act. This,however,is
of little consequence bacause of the fact the lepis-
lature is not restricte d in its enactments by the rules
of the cortnon law in the sune way thiat it is by the
national and state constitution but may at any time al-
ter such rules. Bertl olf v. O'Reilly(74 N.Y. 509)
In considering the liability imposed upon the
liquor dealer himself ra±ther than upon the owner of the
premises upon which the liquor was sold,it,at first,
seemed to me a little incongruous that one should be
licensed by the state to sell liquor and afterwards be
held liable for damages, indirectly suffered by the per-
forfnance of a lawful and licensed act. This question
appears to have b-en raised in one of the first cases
litigated under the act,that of Baker i. Pore (P Hun
556),wherein the defendant, a licensed liquor dealer,
claimed that the "Civil Damage Act " was unconstitutional
for the reason that it impaired the validity of the con-
tract between the excise board and himself. In writ-
inC the opinion of the court,Judge Boardman sut-ested
that the act refers equally to licensed and unlicensed
liquor dealers and but forms a part of the 7-neral ex -
cise law so that one buyinc a license must be construed
to have consented to prorure the same subject to any
restrictions which might be im'Posed by -±e lerislature
for the public welfare ard in the shape nf excise
restrictions. The reasoning of Jud, e Boardniar was soon
after ap. roved in the case of Franklin v. Schermerhorn
( 2 Hun 112) wherein th, court su!-cqested that " Wrhile
the iegislature has provided in the general excise
law for grantin- license for the sale of intoxicating
drinks it has suPeradded in legal effect in this
statute that such license shall be given, taken and
received subject to the qualifications contained in
this act." Again in a late Massachusette's case the
court while arriving at the same conclusion denies that
a license is a contract and asserts that it is " simply
an authority to sell according to law,and subject to
all the limitations,restrictions and liabilities which
the law inposes". Moran v. Goodwin (130 Mass.158,160).
Havinu,,as fully as the limits of our thests will
permit, considered the constitutionality of the act it
may be well for us to consider what the oppTonents of the
act consider as logical objections thereto,althouph they
may not be sufficient as constitutional objections. It
is to be noted in the first place that the "Act to Sup-
press Inteipera, ce ,uauperism,and Crime" ccnstit iting
Chapter 646 of' the Laws of New Yerk State passed in 1873,
is like the similar act in Massachusettes,more severe
than the corredTvonding "Civil Dama.e Acts" in most nf
th other state:.l in sc far as it, in effect,imposes a
penalty upon a lawful as vell as upor an unlawful sale
of intoxicatin.7 liquors. In fact the penalty exists
ihdouendentl~pf any act of carelessness or violation of
the -aw on the part of nit"-er the seller or the owner
of the premises upon which liquor is sold. This can no
more conclusively and concisely be shown than by qvotinr
the languare used by th-3 court in the case of Bertholf
v. O'Reilly (74 TN.Y. 513): "The liability of the land-
lord w said the learned judge in that case,"is not
made to depend upon the nature of the act of the tenant
but exists irrespective of the fact whether the sale
or givin!- away of the liquor vms lawful or unlawful;
that is, whether it was authorized by the license laws of
the state or was made in violation of that law. Nor
does the liability depend upon any question of negli-
gance of the landlord in the selection of the tenant,
or of the tenant in sellivg the liquor. Although
the person to wh(:rji liquor is sold is at the time apryirt ,
ly a man of sober habits,and so far as the vendor
knows,one whose aipetite for strong drink is habitually
controlled by his reason and judrment, yet if it turns
out that the liquor sold causes or contr'ibutes to the
intoxication to whom the gift or so, le is made,under
the infli ence of which he commits an injury to person
or property,the seller and his landlord are by the act
made joint1y and severally responsible. The element
of care or diligence on the part of the seller or lad-
lord does not enter into the question of liability." To
one,therefore, who considers the sale of intoxicatinrg
beverages perfectly lefitimate from a moral as
well as from a legal standpointthe act appea. s o be
one of -reat injustice because it imposes a burden and
liability irrespective of the care and discretion exer-
cised by the vendor or the landlord,the only discrimina-
tion made between the extremely careful and the reckless
vendor arising in the insertion of the Iprovision which
gives the recovery of exemplary damages in certain
cases.
The act therefore is in reality n the nature of
a prohibitory act beinc an act which is desivned to
d scomra,!e and to impose burdens upon tl-e Fenerai liq-
traf1'ic
,,or. In fact,nothhstardirg an opinion vhich I have
somewhere read to the cc-trary,the act, to my mind,
makes every liquor de;ler, to a certain limited ex*ent,
tthe guarantor of tVr discretion whic- shall be exercis-
ed by others whc may e enareJ in the sa'me business
in which he is engaged, -- he is eno&-ed, inas-
much ,,s the man who sells the first glass of liquor con-
tributir, to the intoxication,nay be subjected tc, a
liability under the act as well as he w'h< at another
time and Tlace under more argravating circumstances has
s id the liquor vhich finalE' makes the drinker intoxica-
ted and but for which the intoxication would not have
existed.
The intention of the legislator to place a ban Dn
the sale of liquor in the nature of a penalty further
appears from the construction which has been placed
upon the statute by the Court of A,peals. In the case
of Neu v.McKechnia (C5 N.Y. 632) the court held that
it was not a necessary incident to the liability of a
liquor dealer that he shool, have been able at the time
of the sale to foresee th2 probable result of his act,
and that it was "not necessary that the act which caused
the injury shiould be the natural,reasonable,or probable
consequence of the intoxication," but that it was suffi-
cient that the acts complained of were canmitted while
the drinker was intoxicated, in whole or in part, by
liquors sold by the defendant.
The "Civil Damage Act" is in effect, very similar
to an actrelative to the preservation of game, which
was passed' in this state and referred to in the case
of Pheirs v. Races (60 N.Y. 110). The statute in that
case provided in substance that any person killing,or
selling, or havirg in his possession any gcane birds af-
ter they were dead, during certain periods of the year
should be punished in certain ways therein provided.
The courts held that the prohibition was absolute and
that it constituted no defense to show that they were
killed before the prohibited period or that they '-,ad
been imported from outside of the state limits
"The measures best adapted to this end", said the
court in referring to the p>reservation of garne,"are
for the leislature to determine, and the courts cannot
review this decision. If the regulations operate ir any
respect, unjustly or oppressively, the T'roper remedy
must be applied by that body. Some of the provisions
may be unnecessarily severe, but we carnot say that
those involved in this action are foreign to the objects
sought to be obtained, or outside of the wide disure-
tion vested in the legislature." The "Civil Damage Act"
is,to my mind,almost strictly analogous to this case,as
are the remedies to be -ursued analogous to those hinted
at,violating no provision of the constitution if any
injustice he discovered in the act itself the only rem-
edy is to be found in further and more appropriate action
by the legislature in the wise discretion of which the
act was consider'd essential for the proper re"'ulation
of the traffic hich experience has taught to be in
many instances damaging to the public welfare.
The idea of givingp a rioht of action against any
person selling stron, or spiritous liquors in favor, of
persons injured thereby, is no novel one, for as early as
the year 1857 we find that by Section 28 of Chapter
628 the legislat-oie of tthis state created such a right
of action, but only as against those wh , madd such sales
unlawfully. In fact all previous acts of this nature
in this state, like, thosLnow in force in New Hampshire
and Vermont and in most of the other states, have been
in the nature of penalties for unlawful sales and the
novelty,if any,apTears in the imposition of a restrict-
ion on the liquor traffic as a business, without reg-ard
to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the larticular
sales. Another instance cf what we iay call the sever-
ity of this act,as compared with the excise laws which
have hitherto been enacted, is to be found in the per-
mission which is given to the injured person of joining
as a deiendant with the seller of the liquor the owner
of the premises. This provision has been found to be
a very effective one for the reason that heretofore the
seller has frequently been found unable to respond in
damages. The owner of the premises is ,however, in a
measure protected from the wahton acts of a seller who
is rendered reckless from a knowledge of his own irres-
ponsibility by the provision that " Any unlawful sale
(v '7Ivtnp away of intoxicating liquors works a forfeit-
ure of the tenant or lessee under the lease." TfThe
actionstog,,'nder the"Civil Damage Act" it is to be
noticed, have been crjeatly encouraged, rendered compar-
atively inexrensive and easy to be prosecuted iy the
provision of a -econd section whereby any justice of
the peace is -iven jurisdiction of an action brought
under the act when the claim for darnages does not exceed
Two Hundred Dollars,aid even in such a case, such jus-
tice by associatinr with himself two other justices of
-rhe county may extend his jurisdiction to cover a claim
oi' Five H-indred Dollars.
Considering now somewhat more in detail the provis-
ions of the act itself, we find our attention especially
directed to the actions for injuries to the means of
support of the person seeking to recover damages by rea-
son thereof. Th- title of the statute,as we have already
noticed,is 0 Ant Act to Sulpress Intemperance,Pauperism,
and Crime." it is consequently evident that one of
the ma n purposes of the legislature in passing the
act was to afforo rotection to the V-elpless and depend-
ent. Inasm, ch ,too, as a very iarge proportion of'
the poverty stricker families of our citi 's are in-
debted for their poverty to the habitual iise of intox-
icatin- liquors by the head of such f rily,it is little
to be vwan&.red !,hct fr'om tI-e very enactment of the ?ct
a large mFjority of -he actions which have beer brought
have been based on the claim of " injuries to the means
of surport",. The construction of this clauLse has been
the source of no little controversy ev n among the Su-
preie Court judges theriselves. The claim vias first
made. a right of action would lie against the vendor of
liquors for the injuries resulting frot,' the intoxication
only in those cases in which such an action might have
beer maintained in favo of the plaintiff against the
intoxicated Terson him ,elf,the clai in substance beinr
that by reason of the statute it waF intended that
more perFons shcild be made liable for the injury which
had been comriitted but that it was not intended by the
lepislators to create e new , right of action. In (Ort-
sequence of this course of reasonin- we find the court
in the case of Hayes v. Phelan (4 Run 733),denyir, to
the wife a recovery for loss of means of surport by
reason of te death of her husband consequent tpon his
intoxication. This holding,however, was shortly after
repudiated by the same court in which it was held, and
as I think, justly, that all injuries should be included
within the remedy of ti-e act which were consequert
upon the intoxication,the court reasonin- that if"injury
result in- from death were excluded the minor ard im-
mediate injuries would be provided for but the greatest
of all excluded." Jackson v. Prookins 5 Fun 530.
The decision in Jackson v. Prookins wts affirmed
in Quain v. Russel (2 Fun 319) and the controversy
seems to have been finally settled by the decision of
the Court of Appeals in Mead v. Stratton (87 N.Y. 498)
wherein it was held that the legislators in the passage
of the act intended to give a rirht of action not known
to the Common Law, that there could be a recovery for
consequential as 'Yell as for direct injuries and that'
consequentl, there could be a recovery for loss of means
of support resulting from death,the object of the act
beingT not so much to render more persons liable for the
injury but to " supTress the sale and use of intoxicat-
ing liquors."
It rmusthowever,be borne in mind thatalthough,
as we have seen, the act ij constried liberally in favor
of the Tpersons who have been injured in their means of'
surpurt by reason o~f the intoxicationactutl injury to
the mean. of support must be clearly prover 'nd not
left to inference. The Civil Damage Act does net create
a right of f'ction to recover compensation for merfe loss
of services, as is the case in the right or' action which
is, in this state, given to the widow for the damaqes
resulting to herself and the next of kin by reason of
the death of the husband and father caused by the
negligence of the der'endant. The construction placed
upon the slAtute in this regard clearly arTears from the
case of March v. Mabbit (3 Weekly Dig. 126) as well
as from the lang-age used by the Court of Appeals in
the case of Volans v. Owen (74 N.Y.52R), w-erein the
learned judge states that " where injury to the means of
sup-ort is the gravamem of the action, the plaintiff
in order to t mainta/in his action/,that by or in conse-
quence of the intoxicati n or acts of the intoxicated
person his accustomed means of support have been cut off
or curtailed or that he has been reduced to a state of
dependence b,/ beir- derrived of the supTrt which he
had befcre enjoyed. There must be proof that the ser-
vices were necessary for the support and that he has
been injured in his support. Diminution of' income or
loss of property don't constitute an injury to means of
sup ort if the p in intiff has rk twithstandinn adequate
means of maintenance from accurmulated capital or
property or his remaininr' income is sufficient for
his sur]vort." The right of action for injury to the
means of support exists, of course, in favor of
all those who are reduced to want by reason of' the intox-
ication of the one legally bound to support them and
for whom he has neglected to provide and even Athwgh
no death has resulted from such intoxication. The action
therefore exists in favor of indigent parents fr the
loss of means of support by reason of the intoxication
of the son as well as in favor of the child or wife
for the loss of necessary support resultin' from the
intoxication of the parent or husband. Stevens v.
Cheney (36 Hun 11 . Of course the fact that the wife
or other deFendent person is injured in her means of
sup.port does not prevent her recovering any tirther and
additional damage to herself by reason of any personal
injury suffered or inijury to 1 roperty independent of the
injury to her mears of sup'port. Felyee v. Uoy ris (5 Week.
ly Dig. 343).
In detenninin- the pre-ise amount of damnee to the
dependent person the court will consider all facts vhich
have any conrection whatever with the question of dain-
ages. Thus not only will evidence of the loss of labor,
money,lands,or income contribuiting to the necessary
support of the plaintiff be adiiissible and conpetent
but also evidence of a loss of situation and inability
to get another or insanity,sickness,and dissability, by
reason of which the mea-As of support of the plaintiff
in the future will be cut off or diminished below ,'hat
is reasonable for one in plaintiff's station oflife.
McCann v. Roach (81 111.213) . Thus,too,in Flynn v.
Fgarty (lo6 Ill. 263) the court held that evidence that
the deceased was of industrious habits was admissible
as being relavant to the question as to the amount of
damages suffered by the pl intiff,but at the same time
the same court held that evidence of mental anguish,
arisirrn from th- loss of the society an, companionship
of the deceased was inadmissible as affording no in-
formation upon the questi:n of damages but only tending
to excite sympathy in favor of the rlairtiff and against
the defendant.
It is a noticeable fact that the rules regilating
the admission of .vidence in actions brught for' injury
to the means of s-Lpport are in many respects the same
as those which exist in th, actions brou}t for a recov-
ery of damages resultin- from the negliprence of the
defendant whereby a husband or father has been killed,
yet in some important respects they liffer meterially,
this whtle the contributory negligence of the deceased
is a good defense in the latter case, we find nothing
corresponding to it as a deferse to an uction brouriht
under this statute . In fact, as we shall hereafter see,
no matter how reckless or criminal the act of the intox-
icated person which caused the injury the saloon keeper
is not thereby relieved from liability. It is, however,
true that if' the wife, child, or dependent person who
is laintiff in the action cornives at or voluntarilly
encourages the p)erson in his intoxication arid thus
is instrumiental in br in'irr the loss iipon herself she
can recover, in Iowa at least, no darrnares. Kerney v.
Fitzgerald (,13 Iowa 580). I have been unable to dis
cover any correspondin .- case in P~ew York State,and in-
asmuch as vre have already found that the act in New
York State is for the pvrpose of "stoprin, the sale of
intoxicating liquors rather than to afford - remedy
for injuries sustained, I rnight,T think, with sane
reason question the soundness of the decision.
In another respect, too,the action differs material-
ly from the action for damages resulting from negligence
already referred te,inasmuch as in the latter case we
find that the wife can recover in one action the damages
resulting to herself and the next of kin,while in the
action jnder this statute, although th, court in Frank-
lin v. Schermerhorn (supra) suggested that probably
the legislature intended to give but a single right of
action, yet the fact remains that the wife carnot recover
in one action the damages suffered by herself and child-
ren and that it is improper for tbe several damaged
persons to unite as plaintiffs but th-at erch can re-
cover his or her proportionate share or the damage sof-
fered in a separate action. This to be silre is, un-
fortunate because of the unnecessary liti-etior which
is necessarily attendant upon a j-st recovery for th-
benefit of those rirhtfully dependent upon t1 e deceased.
In v'eality,however, the misfortune is not as real as at
first a lears for the reas,:n that the inconvenience is
in effect, obviated by the decision in Ludwig v. Glaes-
sel ( 34 Hun 312) whereby it is held permissable to
have a guardian appointed for the infant children,who
may then assign their right '" action to tl e mot1-er who
can then recover for the benefit oit all in one litigation
In this connection it may be well to allude t o the
fact that although the seller of t1-e liquor may be
joined as a defendant in the same acti.on, with the owner
of the rremises upon which the intoxicating beverages
were sold, the courts ,as aTT ears from the decisions
in Jackson v. Brookins (supra) and in 1.orenus v. Craw-
foryd(l5 Hun 45), .-ill not permit the joinder as de-
fendants of two or more different individals who, at
diffeirent times arid In Lifl'(vert r laces sold liquor
which contribuited to the intoxication of the person
by whom the injuiry was caused. This doubtlessly, in
various r)spects, is productive of good results for
the reason that the recovering oi" exemplary damages
would frequently be fou.nd to be justifiable in an action
against one certoin individual liquor seller only,
while if numerous vendors were myde defendants and
rendered jointly liable, exemplary damages being justi-
fiable as egainst but oneof the defendants it would be
inequitable to permit the recovery of any such danar)es
and consequently there could be n distinction availa-
ble between a reckless de.,ler and one who always exercis-
ed discretion in the sale of liquor. Inasmuch,too,as
the plairtiff will almost invariably brin' the action
against th one who by reason of his individual negli-
rrence has practically been the cause of the intoxica-
tion,both because thereby he may recover the extra com-
pensation allowed by way of exemplary damages and because
he can in such an action more easily make out a strong
case and one which will appeal to a jury. It follows
that the penalty is made to rest upon the liquor seller
whd is in reality the cause of the intoxication by rea-
sor of his having sold liquor to one whom he must have
known to be already under the influence of liquor. In
one respect, however it mst -be conceded that the rule
is unfortunate for the reason that,inasmuch as in nearly
all tb states, although different parties ia-y be sued,
yet there can be but one recover/ ,(Kearney v. Fitzger-
ald (supra) it recessaril)/ is true that the rlaintiff
may, because perhaps of his g7reater responsibility,
bring tho action against the dealer who, although by
selling some liquor,has contribuited to the intoxication
yet is really not the one who is the most blameworthy,and
in consequence the latter escapes all punishment. Put ,
as re have already seen,the innocence ard 7ood faith of
the liquor dealer constitutes no defense to the action,
and it has even been held both in New York state and
in Massachusettes thai where the bar keephas sold li-
quor to a certain individual without bhe kniowledge or
consent of the liquor dealer( George v. Gobey 128 Mass
289) and evrn contrary to his express instructions
(Smith v. Reynolds 8 Hun 128() the latter is neverthe-
less liable for all damages resulting therefrom.
The only distinction thor which exists in favor of
the vendor whom I have indicated without ?ny reference
herein to the morality of the trade,as the innocent
liquor dealer,is to be found in his ,-xemption froin
liability fi om what I have tertred exemplary damages.
Exemplary damages, or as it ha' va'ously been termed,
vindicative or punitive damages, are based on the
willfulness of the act and upon the moral turpitude and
atrocity of such acts rather than u-on the actual dam-
ages which have been suffered and are consequently to
be ragarded in the light of a punishi ent rather than
measured by way of compensation. In consequence we
find that whenever a liquor dealer sells intoxicants to
a person after he has received a notice to refrain from
doing so or when he made such sales knowing th pur-
chaser to be intoxicated or in the habit of getting
intoxicated,proper grounds exist for the award of
exemplary damages. Grady v. Prigge (2l eekly Dig.61)
Weitz v. Ewen '50 Iowa 34). Accordingly in the case
of McEvoy v. Humphrey(77 Ill.388),wherein 4* it appears
that a husband became intoxicated by reasor of liquors
sold by the defendant aft-r notice by the wife to re-
frain from making such sales to her h -sband and in
consequence the latter lost or squardered $29.00 be-
longing to his wifethe I laintiff in the action,and
although i o other damage was suffered by the wife than
such loss, we nevevthelesF- find the verdict of the
jury for $200 in favor of te plaintiff to have been
considered,on appeal, not to have been excessive or
ground for reversal. Likewise we find that the sale
of liquors without a license,or to one who was known to
habitually sqilandered in dissapation the wages with
which he ought to have si-ported his family furnished
good grounds for the award of exemplary damages inas-
much as such sales must have been made from motives
of cvuelty,wantonness,or recklessness. Davis v.Stand-
ish(20 Kin 115; 95 N.Y. 632).
In the case of Reed v. Terwilliger (42 Hun 310)
for the reason which we have so frequently cited that
the legislature in the passage of the act intended to
go far beyond anything known to the Comion Law and for
the further reason that the landlord and seller are by
the act made jointly liable for any injuries suffered,
the court argued that a landlord would be jointly liable
with the selier for exemrlary darnar'es whenever it
ar teared tl-at the circtimstanceF connected with the
sale were especially agrravatin' although the owner
of the premnises might hvve been comni!etely i-'nrant
of such circumstances. Upon appeal,however,(llr 1,7.Y 530)
the Court _f AlTeals , 'rhile acknowledging the fact that
the legislature crested a cause of act ion not known to
the Comion Law d:nied that they thereby made any ch ang
in the riles for ascertaining -' - mnd deternining
the damages and in effect held that no man could be
rendered liable by way of exemplary damages for the
lawless acts of another. Whenever,however, motives
of recklessness characterize the acts of the landlord,
he is compelled to respond in punitive damages no less
than the vendor is compelled so to respond under sim-
ilar aggravating circumstances. Thus damages ,-hic?
can be re'arded in no other light than vindictive
damages have been rendered against a landlord r7ho has
leased his business for the sale of liquors knowinc"
at the time of such lease that the' lessee was accustomud
to keep a disorderly place,or had been in the habit
of seiling, without a license,or to minors or to habit-
vial drulrnkards. Kreiter v. Nichols (22 Mich.49fl;
Garmsley v. Perkin (30 Mich. 495).
Inasmi ch,how ever, as we have already discovered,
in considerinc, tlre constitutionality of the act the
statute cannot violate any provision of the cc stitu-
tion and still be valid,the courts very naturally have
decided that although several actions might exi-,t for
the same offense by reason of the different persons
injured thereby,still exemplary damages could be but
once silowed for the reason that under orr constitution
a person can be but once put in jeopardy for the same
offenae. Secor v. Taylor (4 Hurt 123). This fact to my
mind, affcrds another arg'nent in favor of so amending
the act as to afford one action by the wif'e in her own
behalf and for, the benefit of the n.-xt of kin for the
reason that "equality is equity" and under this statute
as it nov., exists the first person having 'a right of
action for the same offense and who may recover a
judgment is unjustly preferred to those vho may have
a stronger equ itable right to a j udrmert and yet are fr
one ieason or another del.Eied in prociirinfr th,,ir jndg-
u e nt .
I avin:, now considered,at some length the nature
of the act itself and the remedies afford d for a viola-
tion thereof it but remains for us to consider,as brief-
ly as we -easonably may, the nature of the evidence
which must necessarily be Ip oduced to justify a recov-
ery. From the language of the statute it is evident that
to jistify a recovery against a defendant tlre evidence
produced must clearly establish the facts that the act
causing tle injury was comitted by an intoxicated per-
son or in consequence of his intoxication an. that
such intoxication was caused wholly or in part by the
liquors sold or furnished by the defendant. A mere
sale of intoxicatinr ' liquors , thereforD, car'not justify
a judgment anless the vendee was intoxicated at the time
of coymiitting the act by which the complainant was
injured. McEntee v. Spiehler (12 Daly 435). So,too,
it appears at least in the decisions of a majority of
the states that the intoxication must be the cause of
the injury. Th-s in Schmidt v.Mitchell(84 111.195),
where an action was brought for the plaintiff', injuries
which resulted from the death of the intoxicated per-
son caused by the fault of a surgeon in faillir7n to
propercy, treat a wound viich was received by the intox-
icated person in aT, affray,it was held that no damage
could be rec, vered which res,,lted solely from the
death of siuch person. A similar holdirg was likewise
sustaited in a c se reported in 53 Indiana 517,wherein
it aTm ears that the deceased met his death by reason of
a f'lling barrel which was snspended over the sidewalk,
which accident could not have been forseen or prevented
had the deceased been free from the infioence of liquor
at the time of its occurrence bu t which was caused by
outside influences over which he had no control. These
two cases,last cited, are not ,to be sure, rendered under
the Civil Damage Act in New York Otate but so similar
are the corresponding acts in Illinois and Indiana that
I do ,ot doubt that they will be regarded as possessing
some authority in this state. The decisions in this
state are not entirell in harmony to be sure, with those
rendered in many of the other states,yet I have found
nonewhich I consider actually conflictin7 with the
two 1ast cited which commtiend themselves to my mind as
being founded in reason. It might, however, be con-
sidered somewh-t di'ficult to entirely reconcile the
Illindis case with some of the decisions of our Su-
preme Court. The latter court has repeatedly declared
that in order to justify the recovery it is not necessa-
ry to shoi that the injury produced by the intoxicated
person was the "natural,reasonable,or probable" result
of the intoxication or of the sale of liquors causing
such intoxication,but that it was sufficient should it
appear that the deceased was ,to any extent, deprived
of the natural use of' his faculties or rendered inca-
pable of car.-*ing for himself. Beers v. Walhizer (43
Hun 255); Blatz v. Rohrbach (42 P-Wn 403). In accoi-dance
with this principle the court has held that the wife m
might recover for injury to her means of support arising
by reason of the imprisonment of her husband for a
homicide couritted while he was intoxicated,althouph
it was the imprisonment and not the intoxication and
lhe consequent deprivation of the faculties of her hus-
band during the period of his intoxication which was
-he proximate cause of the inj ry. Beers v. Walhizer
(supra): nor coiild it be claimed that the homicide
could have been forseen b,,' the defendant as a"reasonable
or probable" result of his sale of liquor. It seens,
therefore,and the langua,-,e of the court in Davis v.
Standish (supra) is especially clear upon this poirt
that to justify a recovery for injury to person,prop-
erty,or means of support, it is only necessary that the
jury -hall 1o able to infer from the facts presented for
their consideration that "the intoxication was to such
an extent as to deprive the man of the normal use of
faculties,either physical or mental, so that he is
rendered incapable of carin- for himself", under which
circumstances it may be inferred that the intoxication
is the real although not the immediate cause of such
injury.
As to the second point of evidence regarding the
necessity of proof that the intoxication was caused
wholly or in part by the liquors sold or urrished by
the defendant we find that the courts are more string-
ent in their demands in regard to the evide'nce necessa-
ry to justify a recovery. The evidence of the sale
must bicleal' and not amount to mere conjecture or sus-
picion. Thus it hes been hld that the fact theft the
p~ersTh inflictirg the injulry had be,3 s,'e to come out
of a storve in an intoxicated condition and was known to
have left his hat th.'e was not sufficient pro(f of
such sale. Loveland v. Prir s (32 HlIn 477). The
particularity of the Supreme Court in this regard is
well illustrated by the case of Campbell v. Schlesinger
(48 Hun 28 ) wherein it was held that no aution would
lie ar-ainst the proprietor of a saloon for injury
caused by his barkreper while intoxicated in said sa-
loon,although the proprietor was aware of tl e fact that
such barkeeper was intoxicated about one half of the
time during whi -!. he was tending bar. Frani the opinion
of the court in this case it 9 ! ears that the judge
based his terdict on the fact that,there being no di-
rect proof of th drinking of the liquor,the possibility
existed that the bark: eper procured, and the proprietor
of the saloon sup!osed that he procured the liquor which
caused him to become intoxicated elsewhere than at the
bar at which he was employed.
Th's we find that although in their construction
of the act the courts have recognized its true nature
as one desiTned to inflict a burden on the sale of in-
toxicants and not merely to afford a remedy for a wrong
suffered,they have it the same time not gore beyond the
limits of their strict legal authority. They have re-
fused to sustain a judgment against a liquor dealer
when strict le3 al proof 1-as been lackir, although the
combination of circumstances against him !- ave been
very suspici us, and they have likewise declired to
render a verdict for exemplary damages when such a ver-
dict woild not be in strict '-ccord with the principles
of tbe Common Law and of our own constitution. While
recognizing the liability of the ovwner of the pre mises
for the acts of his lessee they have refused to hold him
responsible without clear' proof that such acts were
performed with his knowledge either actual or con-
structive, and have refused to impose such a liabil-
ity upon him because of his mere inactivity in finding
out the actual facts. Loan v. Etzel (62 Iowa 429).
VWhile recognizin- the especial regard paid in the act
to the rights of the poor and incoriletant they have de-
clined assistance except by virtue of the strict lepal
proef of pauper ism ard incompetency,and have expressly
refused assistance to those who by their oW,±" connivance
and wrong doing have vaived their rights to demand
such aid. li short, while,perhaps in not a few respects,
which I may have already hinted at, the act might well
be remedied by legislative action, the fact remains
that inasmilch as each particular case as it arises must
be construed and decided in accordance with and in
conformity to legal methods and forms of procedure which
are the adaptation of centuries of litigation,but little
chance exists for the rendition of any greater injustice
than such as may be inevitable from the provision s of
the act itself. It can never be forgotten that our
courts and our lerislatures are but parts of that system
of checks and balances which so characterizes our en-
tire scheme of government. Each in its own peciliar way
serves to prevent the excesses of the other. The police
power of the state is one of the most important and
necessary of the powers possessed by our legislature and
certainly in no way, more efficatious to any con~m-unity
can it be exercised than in the regulation and control
of the sale of intoxicants. As explained,controlled,
and regulated by the courts,it can but be true that the
really meritorious provisions in legislative acts which
have been pfssed in the exercise thereof will appear
vhile the inherent faults will be discovered and rem-
edied and future excesses of the same nature prevented
I
